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ABSTRACT 
These days, most data is digitized and processed in various ways by computers. In 
the past, computer owners were free to process data as desired and to observe the 
inputted data as well as the interim results. However, the unrestricted processing 
of data and accessing of interim results even by computer users is associated with 
an increasing number of adverse events. These adverse events often occur when 
sensitive data such as personal or confidential business information must be 
handled by two or more parties, such as in the case of e-Discovery, used in legal 
proceedings, or epidemiologic studies. To solve this problem, providers encrypt 
data, and the owner of the computer performs decoding in the memory for 
encrypted data. The computer owner can be limited to performing only certain 
processing of data and to observing only the final results. As an implementation 
that uses existing technology to realize this solution, the processing of data 
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contained in a smart card was considered, but such an implementation would not 
be practical due to issues related to computer capacity and processing speed. 
Accordingly, the authors present the concept of PC-based High Grade Anti-
Tamper Equipment (HiGATE), which allows data to be handled without 
revealing the data content to administrators or users. To verify this concept, an e-
Discovery application on a prototype was executed and the results are reported 
here. 
Keyword: Anti-Tamper, e-Discovery, Bitlocker, APIHook 
1. INTRODUCTION 
These days, most data is digitized and processed in various ways by computers. In 
the past, computer owners were permitted to process data as desired and to 
observe the inputted data and the interim results. However, the unrestricted 
processing of data and accessing of interim results even by computer users is 
associated with an increasing number of adverse events. These adverse events 
often occur when sensitive data such as personal or confidential business 
information must be handled by two or more parties, such as in the following 
cases. 
1. (1) Epidemiologic studies: Epidemiologic studies often seek to compare 
data concerning (a) physical loads, such as the exposure dosage of 
individuals at a workplace and (b) the incidence of illnesses, such as 
cancer, obtained from hospitals and field studies for investigating 
correlations with various factors. However, when this data is transferred 
to a partner or third party and the usual processing is performed, personal 
information contained in the inputted data or interim results may be 
revealed to the person using the computer to perform the data processing. 
This is a problematic situation from the standpoint of protecting personal 
information. Consequently, at present, the exchange of this data is not 
possible, thereby creating a problem in that epidemiologic studies cannot 
be used to improve the health of citizens. As a current solution, (i) data 
encrypted by the original owner may be transferred to a partner or third 
party, and (ii) the partner or third party may input the encrypted data into 
a computer, which after the data is decrypted, implements certain 
processing and outputs only correlation values, so that the interim results 
and other sensitive information are not accessible to even the computer 
user.   
2. (2) e-Discovery: Japanese companies are often involved in e-Discovery 
performed for US civil court. Prior to preceding to trial in a US civil court 
in both Japanese and US civil courts the defendant and the plaintiff sides 
mutually disclose electronic evidence. At this time, if electronic 
documentary evidence containing a keyword or other security 
mechanism by the plaintiff side exists but is not disclosed, the trial will be 
severely disadvantaged. Conversely, if all accumulated electronic data is 
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disclosed unconditionally, personal information may be revealed and 
critical business information may be leaked unnecessarily to a rival 
plaintiff. For this reason, electronic documents may be partially sanitized 
[4]. The plaintiff side receiving the sanitized electronic documents may 
want to verify with a computer that the sanitized portions do not contain 
keywords, but if viewing the sanitized portions is freely permitted, the 
defendant-side secrets would be revealed unfairly. To resolve these 
problems, computer processing may also determine whether the sanitized 
portions contain keywords, but other processing such as deciphering the 
sanitized portions should not be performed, and the interim results should 
not be revealed. 
Common to the solutions of these problems is that the computer owner performs 
only specific processing of the data and is able to observe only the final results. 
One conceivable means to realize such a solution is to use tamper-resistant 
equipment that prevents the owner from changing the processing or accessing 
interim results. Smart cards (also known as IC cards) are typically used as the 
tamper-resistant equipment. A smart card contains a secret key that is not 
revealed, even to the user, and public key encryption, which is generally used to 
implement digital signatures.  
Smart cards, however, have the problems of slow processing speed, small 
memory, and are difficult for an average person to program using an ordinary 
computer language. Thus, we developed a system that overcomes these problems 
by improving the PC hardware and software. This new system, configured from 
PC-based hardware and from software such as the boot control function (BCF) 
[11] previously developed by the authors, is known as High Grade Anti-Tamper 
Equipment (HiGATE). 
This paper presents the HiGATE concept, and reports the results of the 
application of a prototype to e-Discovery.  
With the heightened interest in the handling of personal and confidential 
information, the range of applications for HiGATE is expected to increase in the 
future. 
To achieve the same objective, the use of an encryption protocol has also been 
envisioned, but such an approach would only be suitable for an extremely narrow 
range of applications and could not be applied to the types of problems 
encountered here. Approaches similar to that used in our research, that is, 
preventing even a computer user from freely processing data and accessing 
interim results, have not been reported in other studies.  
2 OVERVIEW OF PROPOSED SYSTEM 
2.1 HiGATE Requirements 
 HiGATE has the following five requirements. 
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1. A tamper-resistant area exists that even the owner cannot access. 
2. A memory with sufficient capacity for calculations is provided 
3. Arithmetic computations are processed at a fast speed. 
4. Programming by a trusted third-party, rather than the owner, is permitted. 
5. The equipment is easy to realization. 
A smart card is an example of a device capable of satisfying the first requirement 
above. The use of a smart card, however, has the following two problems. First of 
all, the processing capacity presents a problem, especially in cases such as e-
Discovery, where large quantities of data are handled and processing must be 
done within a limited timeframe. Secondly, programming a smart card requires 
the use of special techniques such as micro-programming, and an ordinary person 
would not be able to program a smart card as desired. Thus, the development of 
HiGATE, which satisfies the above five requirements, was needed for 
applications not suitable for smart cards. 
2.2 Measures for Satisfying the Requirements 
(Requirement 1) 
The HiGATE functions necessary to satisfy requirement 1 are listed below:  
① Hardware function 
Capability to prove that the equipment case has not been opened 
② Software functions 
1. Boot control function for application programs 
2. Encryption function for entire hard disk (HDD) 
3. Arithmetic processing function 
4. File delete function that leaves intact the inputted data for calculations 
and the interim results.  
These functions are described in detail in Section 3. 
(Requirements 2, 3, 4 and 5) 
Requirements 2, 3, 4 and 5 can be implemented automatically through the process 
of PC-based development. In other words, PC-based development provides the 
advantages of fast I/O throughput and computational speeds, the capability to 
accumulate large quantities of data, and the ability to use a common programming 
language such as C or JAVA instead of a special programming language. 
Moreover, PC-based development facilitates installation since there is no 
significant need for special equipment. In this case, Windows, with which the 
authors have much experience, was chosen as the OS. 
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3. HIGATE CONFIGURATION 
3.1 Prerequisites 
(Prerequisite 1) The BIOS and OS are running properly. 
(Prerequisite 2) Unauthorized actions are not performed when implementing the 
HiGATE settings. 
(Prerequisite 3) HiGATE does not contain an unauthorized program. 
HiGATE operates under the abovementioned conditions. 
3.2 Possible Unauthorized Actions 
There are three conceivable methods for attacking HiGATE, and these are listed 
below: 
1. (Unauthorized action 1) Forcible opening of the case and extraction of 
information from the memory 
2. (Unauthorized action 2) Removal of the HiGATE HDD and connection 
to another PC to extract the HiGATE internal data and programs, etc. 
3. (Unauthorized action 3) Activation of an unauthorized program to 
modify other programs or steal information. 
3.3 Functions to Protect Against Unauthorized Actions 
(Protection 1) Provide proof that the case has not been opened. 
As in the description of unauthorized action 1, it is conceivable that the case can 
be opened and the memory contents stolen. Accordingly, it is important to prevent 
the case from being opened. This protection may be realized by the following two 
methods. 
1. Cause the power supply or other essential device to shut off and the 
memory contents to disappear if the case is forcibly opened. Methods for 
switching off the power supply include: (a) microswitch-based detection 
of the case opening, (b) detection via a lead switch and a magnet on the 
case cover, and (c) optical detection of the lid opening.  
2. Provide a seal that clearly indicates whether the case has been opened. 
Tamper-resistant labels are an existing technology. If a tamper-resistant 
label is peeled off, an indication that the case has been opened remains. 
By making the data contained in the HiGATE lose its effectiveness when 
a seal is cut and peeled off, unauthorized actions by the user can be 
prevented.  
Here, we decided to use method (2), which is easily achieved. In the future, a 
combination of methods (1) and (2) will enable enhanced safety. 
(Protection 2) HDD encryption 
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HDD encryption is implemented to prevent the HDD used in the HiGATE from 
being removed or connected to another PC and to prevent the HDD contents from 
being modified or extracted as described in unauthorized action 2. An existing 
technology is the BitLocker function which is provided only in Windows Vista 
Enterprise and Windows Vista Ultimate editions. Because Windows Vista 
Enterprise is only sold through volume licensing, we installed Windows Vista 
Ultimate as the HiGATE OS. 
(Protection 3) Boot control (BCF/Vista) 
As described in unauthorized action 3, it is conceivable that an unauthorized 
program can be activated to modify other programs and steal information. 
BCF/Vista [11] is an existing technology developed by the authors to prevent 
such unauthorized actions. The BCF/Vista function is described in detail in 
Section 3.4. 
Other functions include the file delete and arithmetic processing functions. The 
file delete function deletes data from the HDD used with HiGATE. This function 
operates so that the HiGATE user does not leave behind any data after the usage 
of that data has been completed. The HiGATE system handles data which even 
the user is not permitted to view. Accordingly, the continuous retention of data in 
the user’s HiGATE system will lead to an unauthorized action. The arithmetic 
processing function is used in different ways depending on the application, and 
can be developed freely by the program developer. Additionally, unauthorized 
actions through the skillful use of the keyboard are conceivable, but can be 
avoided through the use of the device driver installation control function in 
Windows Vista Ultimate.   
3.4 BCF/Vista 
BCF/Vista was a part of the development of the Dig-Force [2][3] digital forensic 
system. 
BCF/Vista computes hash values for programs that are activated during setup, 
registers these hash values in a white list, and digitally signs the entire white list. 
The OS and then BCF/Vista are set to start next. After they are running, the 
BCF/Vista function computes hash values for application programs as they try to 
start up, and after confirming the validity of the previously registered white list by 
signature verification, the computed hash value is compared to the hash value in 
the white list. If the value is the same as the registered hash value, the program 
starts, but if not registered, APIHook is used to prevent the program from starting.  
As a result, even if an unauthorized program attempts to start up, if Prerequisite 1 
that “the BIOS and OS are running properly,” has been established, the 
unauthorized program can be prevented from running. For further details 
regarding the BCF/Vista function, refer to reference document [11]. 
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3.5 Functional Configuration 
Providing the hardware function and the four software functions listed in Section 
2.2 enables a tamper-resistant area to be realized to protect the OS and the 
arithmetic processing function residing on the HDD, as well as the keys, data, 
etc., residing in memory. Accordingly, an arithmetic processing program created 
by a program developer and placed in the tamper-resistant area can be executed 
correctly by the HiGATE system without any unauthorized actions. The HiGATE 
functional configuration is shown in Figure 1 and smart card and HiGATE 
functions are compared in Tables 1 and 2. 
3
HiGATE structure
Application program
HiGATE basic program
Boot control 
function
(BCF/Vista)
HDD 
encryption 
function
OS(Windows Vista Ultimate)
White list
File delete 
function,
etc.
Hardware (PC‐based with added functions for responding  to 
attempted access of interior)
 
Figure 1.  HiGATE Block Diagram 
 
Table1.  Differences between Smart Cards and HiGATE 
Difference IC Card HiGATE
OS EMV
specification
Windows 
Vista 
Ultimate
Limitation 
due to 
program 
language 
development 
Limited Not 
limited 
Memory RAM (1 
MByte)
RAM (3 
Gbytes)
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Table 2.  Similarities between Smart Cards and HiGATE 
Similarity IC Card HiGATE
Startup of 
predetermin
ed program
Read-only 
semiconduct
or memory
BCF/Vista 
Memory 
cannot be 
accessed 
externally 
Encryption 
circuit or 
single-chip 
implementati
on of 
memory
Case cannot 
be opened 
with tamper-
resistant 
label 
False 
environmen
t cannot be 
created 
Access 
controlled by 
CPU 
HDD 
encryption 
Tamper-
resistant 
area 
Access 
controlled by 
CPU 
・BCF/Vist
a 
・HDD 
encryption 
・Tamper 
-resistant 
label
 
4. HIGATE OPERATION 
This section describes the HiGATE operation: 
① HiGATE manufacturing phase 
② Program installation phase 
③ Setting phase 
④ Usage phase. 
Persons involved in the above four steps of HiGATE operation include the 
manufacturer, program creator, and user. 
① Manufacturing phase 
The manufacturer preinstalls the OS (Windows Vista) and BCF/Vista 
required for HiGATE in the HiGATE PC, and then transfers the HiGATE 
system to the program developer. 
② Program installation phase 
The program developer receives the HiGATE system from the manufacturer, 
and loads the processing programs necessary for application into HiGATE. 
③ Setting phase 
After program installation, the HiGATE system and BCF/Vista are 
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configured with the necessary settings. At this time, the program creator 
implements the settings with administrator privileges. 
(1) BIOS settings 
To prevent booting of an OS installed on the PC other than Windows Vista, 
“Set the BIOS password” and “Restrict bootable storage to the HDD” 
BIOS settings are implemented, and only the program creator knows the 
BIOS password.  
(2) User account settings 
So that the operator cannot operate Windows services and the task scheduler 
from the user account that is utilized when operating the PC, the user account 
is not given administrator privileges.  
(3) Program installation 
Controller program files that comprise BCF/Vista, agent program files, and 
the white list files are installed. These files are stored on a drive encrypted by 
BitLocker (described below), and are set as read-only files that cannot be 
overwritten or deleted by the user account. 
(4) BitLocker settings 
BitLocker is a drive encryption function of Windows Vista Ultimate. 
BitLocker is used to encrypt all the drives on an HDD so that an attacker is 
unable to remove the HDD from the PC and use another PC to modify the 
programs that comprise BCF/Vista.  
(5) Windows service settings 
Nanshiki Corp.’s sexe freeware was used to register the controller as a 
Windows service. This service was registered under the name 
MonitoringController (hereafter referred to as MC Service). As a result, the 
controller starts up automatically after Windows Vista has started. With this 
setting, however, MC Service will not start if the user account is logged in 
while in safe mode. Therefore, MC Service information is added to the 
Windows registry so that MC Service will start even in safe mode. 
(6) Task scheduler settings 
The task scheduler is used so that startup occurs when an agent logs into the 
user account. 
After implementing these six settings, tamper-resistant labels are affixed to all 
HiGATE parts that could be opened.  
④ Usage phase 
The user uses a HiGATE system which has been set up as above. At this 
time, a user account that does not have administrator privileges is used by the 
user.  
These are the phases of HiGATE operation. By allocating the above roles to the 
participants involved, the participants can be prevented from performing any 
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unauthorized actions. HiGATE users do not possess administrative privileges, and 
therefore it would be difficult for them to perform an unauthorized action on the 
data. Moreover, since the program creator does not possess the HiGATE system, 
it would be nearly impossible for him or her to implement an unauthorized action 
on the data handled by the user. Accordingly, none of the participating individuals 
are able to perform an unauthorized action on the data used and handled by the 
HiGATE system. The prerequisite that the BCF/Vista administrator does not 
perform any unauthorized actions is made possible by this system. 
5. APPLICATION TO E-DISCOVERY 
In this section, the HiGATE system is applied to e-Discovery. The e-Discovery 
system described is the “e-Discovery System for Sanitizing Disclosure 
Information and for Securing Evidence” [1] proposed by Takatsuka et al. 
5.1 e-Discovery 
The US Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) were amended in December 
2006 so that in US civil litigation, corporations are obligated to disclose electronic 
evidence during the discovery phase held before the start of a civil trial. This 
disclosure of electronic evidence is known as e-Discovery [5][6][8]. Figure 2 
shows the basic flow of the e-Discovery procedure.  
Plaintiff
Plaintiff’s
attorney
Defendant’s
attorney
Defendant
Forensic consulting company
Judge
Court
? Retaining 
counsel
? Litigation
? Retaining  
counsel
? Data collection 
(e‐mail, etc.)
? Keyword 
specification
? Data processing
? Data  
disclosure
? Data  verification
? Submission 
of evidence
Keywords are selected words 
that are highly  relevant to the case
E‐Discovery in narrow sense is underlined.
 
Figure 2.  e-Discovery Procedure 
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5.2 e-Discovery System Proposed by Takatsuka et al. 
First, the plaintiff side provides the defendant side with keywords which relate to 
the case. Then, using those keywords, the defendant side discloses files relating to 
the case. However, these files may include information such as company secrets 
that the company does not want to disclose. As a solution, electronic sanitizing 
technology [4] is used. The defendant side completely sanitizes documents that do 
not contain keywords, and partially sanitizes documents that contain both 
keywords and passages which the company does not want to disclose. This 
method permits the disclosure of only the minimum required data. With the 
present sanitization technology, however, a keyword may be contained in an area 
to be sanitized, and verification thereof is nearly impossible. Takatsuka et al. 
solved this problem by encrypting the data contained in a sanitized area. Data that 
has been subjected to sanitization with encryption is disclosed to the plaintiff side. 
The plaintiff side accepts and verifies the data. At that time, the plaintiff side 
verifies that keywords are not contained in sanitized areas.  
With this process, however, the decrypted results of sanitized locations may be 
unfairly observable. Therefore, a tamper-resistant security device is used so that 
interim results cannot be observed, and the HiGATE system is used for this 
purpose. Here, a HiGATE system that includes the program part developed for e-
Discovery is referred to as HiGATE/e-Discovery. 
We developed the minimum needed programs for HiGATE/e-Discovery. The 
languages used are C# and C++, and constitute a total of approximately 3,000 
steps.  
 
5.3 HiGATE/e-Discovery Operation 
This section describes the operation when HiGATE is applied to e-Discovery. 
HiGATE is used as a security device at the application site. Application of the 
HiGATE system solves the problems of data interference by the plaintiff side and 
the slow processing speed associated with smart cards.  
1. HiGATE/e-Discovery manufacturing and program loading  
 
The manufacturer transfers the HiGATE system to the program 
developer. The program developer loads e-Discovery software into the 
HiGATE system. The e-Discovery software program has five functions 
for digitally verifying keyword files, decrypting sanitized passages, 
verifying whether keywords exist in a decrypted passage, verifying 
evidence, and extracting files relating to the case. 
2. HiGATE/e-Discovery settings  
 
The HiGATE settings were described in Section 4. e-Discovery 
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keywords are also delivered and the plaintiff and defendant sides 
exchange public keys.  
3. HiGATE/e-Discovery usage  
 
The plaintiff side inputs the data received from the defendant side into 
HiGATE/Discovery, and runs the program. This enables the plaintiff side 
to verify that keywords are not contained in the sanitized areas. Next, the 
plaintiff side reviews only the data related to the case, and moves ahead 
with the litigation. 
Based on these considerations, the applicability of HiGATE to e-Discovery 
appears promising. 
6. CONCLUSION 
This paper has proposed hardware that is equipped with a tamper-resistant 
function that cannot be modified by even the hardware owner, has fast I/O 
throughput and arithmetic processing speeds; is capable of accumulating large 
quantities of data that can be programmed similarly to a PC and can be developed 
inexpensively and easily. A prototype was built and the results of an application 
of e-Discovery were reported.  
The basic HiGATE program developed this time has only minimal functionality, 
but we intend to expanded the functionality in the future, and improve the ease-of-
use and safety. 
The HiGATE system is suitable for application to situations requiring technology 
for proving that an administrator has not accessed files or participated in the 
processing. In addition to e-Discovery, the application is thought to be possible in 
many other fields, such as data matching in an epidemiologic study. 
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